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Weexplore the interaction between two facts. The first is that incomeis
variable; the second is that the tax and transfer system transforms before tax
income into after tax income in highly non—linear ways. The effect is to penal-












The earned income tax credit (EITC) is a refundable taxcredit on the ear-
nings of families with dependents. It operates as anearnings subsidy and is
intended to encourage labor market participation. In 1982 the subsidypaid to
an eligible family with an earned income of $7500 wasabout $250. In this
paper, we show that, at least in one extreme case,the EITC provides instead
an incentive to leave the labor market of about $800 to afamily with expected
income of the same $7500.
This seems a dramatic example of Milton Friedman's dictumthat government
policies accomplish exactly the opposite of what they areintended to
accomplish. It is thus appropriate that another ofFriedman's theories, the
permanent income hypothesis, should provide the simplest(but not the only)
explanation of how the EITC (and other aspects ofthe tax and transfer system)
should discourage work.
One of the main premises of the permanent income hypothesisis that income
is variable. Another is that income earners are (and policymakersand social
critics should be) more concerned with permanent or expectedincome than with
particular realizations of the random process which generatesannual income.
Yet taxes are levied on current income. Since tax andtransfer systems are non-
linear, they can substantially affect the transformationof random current
income into after tax expected income.
In this paper, we show that the current system of taxesand transfers in the
United States has substantial and capricious effects on thetransformation of
current pretax income into permanent after tax income.We examine not only
the EITC but also the federal income tax in general andtransfer programs such
as AFDC (Aid to Families with DependentChildren) and Social Security. Not
all of these tax and transfer programs discourage work. Forexample, for.2
families with an expected income of $5,000 who are eligible for the AFDC
program,the tax and transfer system provides a work subsidy of almost
$2,000.
The mechanism which causes these effects is straightforward. Since income
is variable we may write
where Y is expected (or, in Friedman's terms, permanent) income andrepresents
the transitory variation in income.'Taxes are levied on current income y,
rather than expected income Y. The tax and transfer system transforms current
income y into after—tax income x. We can write this in general form as
x =B(y).
Expected after tax income is E[B(y)]. If we assume individuals base their
labor supply decisions on expected after—tax income, the shape of the schedule
B(.) determines how the tax and transfer system rewards or punishes variabi-
lity. If B(.) is concave, as it will be if the tax system is progressive,
then Jensen's inequality implies that the tax system will penalize variabi-
lity. If BC.) is convex, as it will be if the tax system is regressive, then
the tax system will reward risk. The tax and transfer system in the U.S. is
not consistently progressive or regressive. The EITC example given above (and
presented in more detail in Section III below) is an example of income
variability occurring in a region where B(.) is concave. In the AFDC
example, income variability occurred in a region where B(.) is convex.
We now discuss how to assay the magnitude of the effect we are examining.
The certainty equivalent after-tax income y is defined as the solution to3
B(y) =E[B(y)].
We measure the effect of the tax system on variability by the ratio
R =
Ifthe tax system is linear, R will be equal to unity. Under a progressive
tax system, B(.) will be concave and R will be less than unity.Under a
regressive tax system R will be greater than unity. The tax andtransfer
system in the United States is neither convex nor concave (seeHaustnan (1983)
and Moffitt (1982)); there can be no general presumption that R is greater
or less than unity. We present calculations below which suggestthat for
reasonable estimates of the size of the variable component of income, R ranges
from .78 to 1.38 for individuals with different tax statuses and different
levels of expected income.
Before we present these estimates it is worthwhile trying to think about
what R measures. At high income levels it is simply a way of measuring the
extent to which the tax system encourages or discourages risk taking.However
in thIs paper we focus on the poor. We do so for two reasons. First, as
discussed in the next section, the amount by which R deviates from unity is
determined by two things; the size of the kinks in the tax system and the
amount by which income varies. In section III we present evidencewhich
suggests that in the U.S. the tax and transfer systemscombine to produce a
very kinky tax system at low levels of incomeand that the earnings of the
poor are quite variable. These two factors interact toproduce values of R
which differ significantly from unity. Our second reason for focusing onthe
poor is that for them R may be given a moredramatic interpretation than the
mere encouragement or discouragement of risk taking. For manyof the poor,4
welfare and equivalent activities such as participation in training programs
offer an income stream that is far more certain than that obtainable from
participation in the labor market. R measures the ratio between expected
income available in the labor market and the equivalent certain income which
would make withdrawal from the labor market attractive. A low R ——associated
with progressive taxes ——discourageslabor market participation. A high R
encourages it. Under this interpretation, an R of .8 means that a welfare
program which offers certain income equal to 80% of expected (before—tax)
income is as attractive as participation in the labor market. Alternatively,
a guaranteed public jobs program at the same certain wage would be more
attractive than private—sector employment.
An unrealistically simple model underlies the discussion of the preceding
paragraph. We wrote as if the labor supply decision for an individual were
equivalent to deciding once a year whether or not to participate in a lottery.
If he does participate in the labor market he draws his annual labor market
income from a distribution with known characteristics and anticipates a net
gain of E[B(y)]. If he chooses not to participate he gets a certain income
of, say y. In making his labor supply decision he compares these two quan-
tities and chooses to enter the labor market only if E[B(y)] > y. This story
is wrong for at least three reasons. First, the labor supply decision is made
continually through the year; individuals drop in and out of the labor market
and adjust their hours of work (when they can). Second, the benefits to be
gained from not participating in the labor market are not certain; eligibility
criteria and program benefits change. Third, we have assumed individuals are
risk neutral. Taking these factors into consideration seems quite difficult.
One of the contributions of this paper is the simple analytic formula of5
equation (1) below which relates R to the variability of income and the cur-
vature of the tax system. We do not know how to modify this formula to take
these factors into account. It seems likely that a more realistic model of
labor supply and of welfare programs would reduce the size and significance of
the effects we report; abandoning risk neutrality would increase them.
II. How Different is R From Unity? Theoretical Results.
The magnitude of the effect we are looking at depends on the variability
of income and the shape of the tax system. In this section we present
calculations which show those parameter combinations that will produce
an R which is much different than unity. Our calculations are based on the
following observation which is proved in Appendix A. For a given probabi—
lity distribution of income F(s), the progressive tax system with maximal
marginal tax rate t which minimizes R is that which taxes all income above y
at rate T and leaves all income below y untaxed. (Of course, y is not inde-
pendent of the tax system; it Is the solution to B(y) = E[B(y)]). The R mini-
mizing tax system is a linear tax system with a single kink, a form of taxation
often advocated because of its simplicity.3
If income is lognormally distributed then there is a simple analytic
relationship (derived in Appendix B) between the marginal tax rate, t, the
coefficient of variation, c, and R:
(1) T = (1-R)/[(l-((log R -cJ2)/cl))-R(1-((logR +
where ()isthe cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random
variable and = log(lc2). Table 1 gives the results of calculations which
use this formula. In interpreting this table It is well to keep in mind that6
it represents extreme cases. If income is log normally distributed with a
coefficient of variation equal to unity and if the highest marginal tax rate
is 51%, then the minimum value which R can assume is .8. R will attain this
value only if the tax system has a single kink, leaving all income less than
untaxed and taxing all income greater than y at a rate of 51%.
Furthermore only persons with a level of expected income equal to y will have
an R of .8; other persons with a different permanent income (but with current
income log normally distributed with the same coefficient of variation) will
have an R between .8 and 1. If the tax system has several brackets (but the
top bracket is 51%) then R is larger than .8.
We choose the lognormal for use in Table 1 for three reasons. First,
the lognormal permits us to obtain Table 1 analytically. Second, empirical
work on earnings commonly uses the log of earnings as a dependent variable;
it often assumes that earnings are lognorniaiiy distributed. As a consequence
most empirical reports of the variability of earnings are estimates of the
variance of log earnings, a2. If earnings are lognormally distributed, there
is a simple analytic relationship between this parameter and the coefficient
of variation, c:
c =(exp(a2)—1)1k.
Since we measure variability of earnings by c, this correspondence is useful.
Finally, experiments with exponential, binomial, and truncated normal distri-
butions suggest that the results of table 1 are robust; if the mean and
variance of income are held constant, the first significant digits of the
entries in table 1 do not, for the most part, change when the table is re-
calculated using these distributions.
Table 1 shows that if income is variable, kinks of moderate size could make7
R small for some people. Kinks, that is, changes in marginal tax rates, of the
order of .24 or .44 are, at minimum, necessary to produce reasonably low R's.
In the next section we present calculations for the United States which suggest
that for some people R is as low as .78; for others it is as high as 1.38.
III. How Different is R from Unity? Estimates of the Effects of Current United
States Tax and Transfer Programs.
In the previous section we have shown that, in the worst case, a single—
kink tax system would have to have a marginal tax rate of more than .24 to
generate an R of .90. In this section we calculate the ratio R for several
major tax and transfer programs in the U.S. to see if the kinks in those
programs can generate an R more than .10 or so away from one. We shall assume
that the log of earnings is normally distributed with mean p and variance a2.
Expected income is given by Y =exp(p+ i/ a2). As we have observed above, a is
determined by the coefficient of variation, c. We shall perform our calcula-
tions for different values of expected income, Y, and c.
Since some of the largest kinks in the tax and transfer system occur near
the bottom of the income distribution, we shall pick several low values of Y.
But which values of c to examine is not as obvious. Cross—section earnings
regressions, such as those of Mincer (1974), provide values of c (calculated
from the estimated variance of log earnings) in the neighborhood of .60—.90.
However, it could be argued that cross—sectional variation exaggerates the
variation in transitory income for a single individual because of heteroge—
neity across individuals. Many authors have instead estimated earnings equations
from panel data; such a procedure yields an estimate of the variance in ear—8
nings for the same individual over time. Most studies have done so with some
sort of error components structure ——seeLillard and Willis (1978) for one
example and MaCurdy (1982) for a more recent one with a very general structure
for the error term. These studies usually imply coefficients of variation (of
the transitory component of the error term) of from .50 to .80, with sub-
stantial differences across studies. Unfortunately for our purposes, the
variance of the transitory error is always assumed to be independent of the
level of the permanent income, so no information is provided on whether the
(permanently) low—income population has a larger variance than the rest of the
population. Studies which focus only on low—income individuals (e.g., Hausman
and Wise, 1979), maintain the same independence assumption In the stochastic
specification of the error term. Fortunately, Gottschalk (1981) has calcu-
lated the standard deviation of earnings over a six—year period for each indi-
vidual in the National Longitudinal Survey of Men, and has tabulated the mean
of the standard deviations by the level of mean earnings over the period.
Professor Gottschalk graciously performed special tabulations for us which
sh that that coeffIcient of variatIon in the lowest quintile of the popula-
tion is 1.35. It falls to about .50 in the next highest quintile and then
down to about .20 for the rest of the population. Since we are interested in
the low—income sector of the population, we shall therefore perform our calcu-
lations for c's ranging from .50 tol.35.
Federal Income Tax. Figures 1—4 show the disposable income schedules for
several tax and transfer programs. The first figure refers to the federal
personal income tax, including the earned income tax credit (EITC). For all
our calculations we have assumed a four-person family with a single earner and
no other Income. All tax and transfer programs are evaluated in their 1982forms. As the figure shows, the present income tax actuallysubsidizes ear-
nings up to $5,000 of income. This feature hasbeen present since the
mid—1970's and is a result of the EITC, which is a refundable taxcredit for
which families with dependents are eligible. While it ISanearnings subsidy
up to $5,000, it becomes an earnings taxbeginning at $6,000 because it must
be phased out. The marginal tax rate begins at —.10, is0 at $5,000 and then
becomes a positive .13 at $6,000. A concave kink of about.23 is thereby
created (note that this is close to the .24 of Table 1). Afurther kink, one
which is convex, is created at about $11,000 of earnings,the point at which
the subsidy drops to zero and the regular marginal tax rates begin.
Our calculated values of R for the federal tax are shownin the first five
rows of Table 2. As should be expected, R is inverselyrelated to c.
However, it is quadratically related to mean incomebecause our middle ranges
of income fall around the concave kink and our high rangesfall around the
convex kink. CR would fall again at higher incomelevels.) As the results
show, R does fall to .90 and a bit below when ctakes on a value of 1.35 and
the individual's permanent income is slightly above the concavekink ($7,500
in the table). In this particular case y is $6,685, morethan $800 below Y.
This is a large amount in absolute terms. It is also largerelative to the
effect of the tax system on after—tax permanent income——atY =$7500,the tax
system provides about a $250 subsidy to working asa result of the EITC
(indeed the intent of the EITC is to encourage work);but the effect of risk
on expected after—tax labor earnings Is almostthree times this amount, and
negative.Thus the phenomenon we are examining in this paper seems quan—
titively important relative to the usual effectsof tax systems discussed in10
certainty models ——at least if the coefficient of variation is high and if an
individual's permanent income falls in a certain range.
AidtoFamilies with Dependent Children (AFDC). The major transfer
program in the U.S. for poor families is AFDC. However, in most states only
families without an able—bodied male present in the household can receive
it.5Hence the female—headed population is the largest beneficiary. In 1982
the statutory tax rate in the program in most states was .67, as shown in
Figure 2. This tax rate applies until benefits end, at which point the
point the federal income tax system (including the EITC) takes over.6
However, in some states ——Indianais an example (Hausman, 1983) ——arange
of zero marginal tax rates is imposed at low earnings levels. In Indiana,
as shown in Figure 3, the zero rate applies over the first $1,000 of earnings.
The values of R for AFDC in Table 2 show that the convex kinks
generated by the transfer program can have sizable effects. At c =1.35,R
reaches 1.38 if permanent income is $5,000, not far from the convex kink.
The value of y in this case is $6,900, almost $2,000 above Y ——again
a large amount. Moreover, It should be noted that all the R values
we have calculated are greater than 1.0, even those at Y =$12,500.At higher
earnings levels, of course, R would fall below 1.0. But at $12,500 and below,
the c's we have used imply that the risk of falling below the eligibility
point is sufficiently high that the work—encouraging effects of the program
dominate the work—discouraging effects of the progressive rates at higher
points. The same is true in the Indiana AFDC system ——atthe Y's we have
calculated, all the R's are still greater than 1 (even though somewhat smaller
than before because of the presence of the concave kink).711
Social Security. We have also calculated our R ratios for the Social
Security program because it contains (to the authors' knowledge) the most
8
severe concave kink of any major tax or transfer program in the U.S.As shown
in Figure 4, Social Security benefits are not reduced unless earnings rise
above about $5,000, at which point they begin to be taxed on a 50 percent
rate. The federal tax begins at about $7,000, whereupon the marginal tax rate
rises to .65. Benefits end completely at about $16,000 of earnings, at which
point a large convex kink is generated.
As Table 2 shows, this program generates the lowest values of R of any
program we have considered. Those with permanent income in the range $5,000 —
$7,500——whoare most affected by the concave kink ——havevalues of R that
are almost always below .90 and even below .80 at high values of c. At Y =
$7,500and c =1.35,y is almost $2,000 below Y. Consequently, to the extent
that the aged face risk in their labor earnings, this program would seem to
have significant work—discouraging effects at these low earnings levels. Of
course, at higher levels closer to the convex kink, values of R are greater
than one, as they are for any transfer program.
IV. Summary and Conclusion.
In this paper we have shown that the U.S. tax and transfer system has
potentially large effects on risk—taking in the labor market, effects which
vary greatly across individuals. Depending upon one's eligibility for dif-
ferent types of transfer programs and upon the mean and variance of an
individual's earnings, the effect may be quite large. For many, of course,
the effect discussed here will be insignificant. But the potential for large
effects suggests that these effects be taken into account in the design of such12
programs ——alongwith the usual efficiency and equity effects.
That these other effects ——whichwe have ignored ——areimportant should
be stressed. A superficial reading of this paper would suggest that its main
lesson is that regressive tax systems are desirable because they encourage
work. This is, of course, not our conclusion. We merely urge that the effect
of sharp kinks in the tax system on those with variable earnings be taken
into account in the design and analysis of tax systems. This topic cries out
for treatment as an optimal tax problem and for a more realistic model of the
labor supply decision. Both problems must be left for future work.13
Appendix
A. We represent a tax system by a function B(y) which gives the amount
of after tax income retained by a person with a pretax income of y. A
progressive tax system is one in which B(.) is increasing, concave,and satis-
fies
(2) B(O) =0.
Let be the maximum marginal tax rate of a tax system. Then
=1—urn B'(y).
y+
We say a tax system is i—admissible if it is increasing, concave,satisfies
(2) and it's maximum marginal tax rate is less than or equal to r.
An example of a iadmissibletax system is the piecewise linear system
which does not tax income which is less than or equal to k and taxesincome




k + (1—t)(y—k) if y > k
Throughout this appendix we consider the effect of a tax systemBC.) on
expected after tax income when pretax income y is a randomvariable with sup-
port [0, M]. For a tax system B(.), define as the solution to
B(y) =
isa certainty equivalent. Under a tax system B(.), acertain income of
gives the same expected after tax income as therandom income y.
For any c(O,l) there is a unique solution to the equation14
(3) =
E[B1;(y)].
To see this let g(x) =xand h(x) =E[B(y)].
We seek a solution, ,to
g() =h().Now g(O) =0,and h(0) =(1—T)E[y]> 0. However, for> 0
g(M+c) =M+c> h(M+c). Thus there is at least one solution to (3). There
is only one since g'(x) =1and h'(x) =t[1—F(x)]< 1.
Proposition: Let i- be the solution to (3); then BT;(.) is the r—admissible
tax system which minimizes y where y is defined in (2).
The proof is a consequence of the following simple result.




Proof of Proposition: Suppose there is a T—admissible tax system (.)other
than BT9,(•) such that %()E[(y)]and< where y Is the solution to








which contradicts the Lemma.








We show that B is a t—admissible tax system which minimizes both it, and R Z,T 2
Clearly the 'r—admissible tax system which does not tax income <z and taxes
all income > z at rate t minimizesR2. Such a system minimizes the numerator
of while it maximizes the denominator. Consider the problem offinding a
t—admissible tax system which minimizesR1. We need only concern ourseif with
how income is taxed on the interval [0, z]. Thenumerator of is
(proportional to) expected after tax income when income is distributedon [0,
z]; the denominator of is after tax income on income of z. Any progressive
tax system will decrease the denominator ofR1 proportionately at least as
much as it decreases the numerator, for under aprogressive system a person
with income less than z is taxed no more heavily thana person with income z.
Thus the progressive tax systems which minimizeR1 are linear over the range
[0, zJ. Since B(.) is linear over [0, z] it is i—admissible and minimizes
both R1 and R2.16
B. The following equation is used to compute Table 1:
(4) T = (l-R)/[(1-((1og R -- a2)Ia))
-R(1-((logR + -
where4(.) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random
variable. To derive (4) observe first that if B(.) is the tax system which
minimizes R and if y is distributed with density f(s) and cumulative distri-
bution function F(s), then
= B(Yc) = E[B(y)] = Jyf(y)dy—TJ(y_y)f(y)dy.
0
Thus,
(5) y = Ey + ty[l —F(y)]
—Tjyf(y)dy.
Now if log y is normally distributed with mean p and variance a2, then
(6) EyYexp(p+a2).
Furthermore, it can be shown (Johnson and Kotz 1970, p. 129) that
(7) Jyf(y)dy= Y [1 —((log— — a2)/a)I.
Since
(8) R =
We can substitute in (7) to obtain17
(9) 1yf(y)dy=Y[1—((logR + log Y —p—o2)/a)]
ye
=Y[1—(logR 02)/a)]
The last step follows from (6). A similar substitution shows that
(10) 1 —F(y)1 —((logR + log Y —
= 1—((logR + -2),)
Substituting (8), (9) and (10) into (5) and rearranging we obtain (4)18
FOOTNOTES
1As Gary Chamberlain has pointed out to us, our analysis does not depend
on £beingsubjectively uncertain. It could represent known variations in
earnings which will occur as an individual ages and his value in thelabor
market changes. The analysis we give below applies to these predictable
changes ——with certain obvious changes to deal with discounting. (See
Rothschild (1969)). However, to simplify our exposition we shall refer to all
variability as risk.
2Those familiar with Atkinson's (1970) work on the measurement of inequality will
note that y is the same as his equally—distributed equivalent: our R is equal
to 1—I where I is his measure of inequality.
3An obvious analogous result applies to regressive tax systems. In the
next section we note that in fact non—concave kinks (regressive portionsof the
tax and transfer system) are as important in driving R away from unity as are
4Mirer (1974) presents some similar estimates over a three—year period. We
use Gottschalk's because they come from direct calculations ofeach individual's
standard deviations of earnings, whereas Mirer's come from the variances of
regression error terms. As the disccusion in footnote 1 above indicates,both
calculations underestimate variability since they disregard predictable
growth of income.
Gary Chamberlain has pointed out to us that there aredifficulties in
inferring from panel data that the variance of income differsfor people
according to their average income. A complete model would explainhow
variables such as education and age determine average income, as well as the
variability of income.19
5Somestatesoffer AFDC benefits to such families, but only if the male is
unemployed. Participation rates in the program are consequently low. Such
families can receive Food Stamps, however, but the cash equivalent values are
inconsequential relative to AFDC.
(forthcoming) and others have shown that the effective tax rate
in the AFDC program is considerably lower than this. We also calculated our
R values for these lower tax rates, but we do not present the results because
their qualitative nature is the same as those here. The convex kink merely
occurs at a higher income level.
7We would like to note at this point that the lognormal assigns a zero
probability to non—work, possibly an undesirable feature when studying a
transfer program. To see its effects we also simulated and made our calcula-
tionswith a displaced log—normal with 20 percent of the distribution
negative(i.e., a one—fifth chance of being unemployed). The resulting R
ratios were all in the same range as those in Table 2.
8The case of a "notch" ——wherebenefits are discontinuously reduced to
zero and the marginal tax rate i.s over 100 percent ——Iseven more concave
The R ratios would be even smaller in this case.
9Since the EITC can be received only by families with dependents, we
assume that the aged do not receive it.•20
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